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ABSTRACT
The adoption of smart home Internet of Things (IoT) devices con-
tinues to grow. What if your devices can snitch on you and let us
know where you are at any given point in time? In this work we
examined the forensic artifacts produced by Nest devices, and in
specific, we examined the logical backup structure of an iPhone
used to control a Nest thermostat, Nest Indoor Camera and a Nest
Outdoor Camera. We also integrated the Google Home Mini as an-
other method of controlling the studied Smart Home devices. Our
work is the primary account for the examination of Nest artifacts
produced by an iPhone, and is also the first open source research
to produce a usable forensics tool we name the Forensic Evidence
Acquisition and Analysis System (FEAAS). FEAAS consolidates ev-
identiary data into a readable report that can infer user events (like
entering or leaving a home) and what triggered an event (whether
it was the Google Assistant through a voice command, or the use of
an iPhone application). Our results are important for the advance-
ment of digital forensics, as there are cases starting to emerge in
which smart home IoT devices have already been used as culpatory
evidence.
KEYWORDS
Internet of Things Forensics, Mobile device forensics, Nest Device
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and Analysis, Mobile Forensics
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1 INTRODUCTION
More than 20 billion IoT devices will be connected by 2020 according
to a prediction by Gartner [13]. In North America, by 2021, more
than half of all homes will become smart homes [22]. Another
report by Statista [30] shows that about 25 million homes in North
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America will use smart thermostats by 2019. A recent study by
Phadnis [26] showed that on average, there are 10 connected devices
per household, including IoT streaming cameras. All these statistics
are strong indicators of how IoT is making waves into our lives,
and specifically our homes.
IoT devices, although may help secure and monitor homes, can
also become rich sources of forensic evidence. This has proven to
be the situation in recent court cases. An example is the case of
Richard Debate in Connecticut, where evidence from the smart
security system of a home, augmented by data from his wife’s Fitbit
were imperative in building a story that points to him murdering
his wife [1]. One IoT device platform that is seeing wide adoption
is the Nest platform.
Nest devices have become a household staple. Since 2011 Nest
has sold more than 11 million devices with its first product being
the thermostat [33], and was later bought by Google in 2014. With
Nest devices being placed around a house, investigators can now,
through circumstantial digital evidence infer when someone left a
home, when they came back and when someone entered and left a
room. Due to the popularity of Nest devices, the paradigm shift to a
smart-home IoT forensic ecosystem (See Figure 1), and the evidence
IoT devices produce, it becomes important to forensically examine
IoT devices in home environments.
Our work makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, we present the primary ac-
count for the forensics of the Nest devices and their compan-
ion devices (mobile devices used to control them).
• We built a system using open-source tools to automate the
companion device acquisition, IoT device acquisition, and
report engine for the Nest ecosystem1.
• We show how inferences can be made about a user’s location
using the collected evidence.
• We share our dataset and associated artifacts with the foren-
sics community to stimulate future work in this area2.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we share back-
ground information and related works. In Section 3, we discuss
various challenges in IoT forensics and different factors involved in
evidence extraction from a smart-home IoT ecosystem. Section 4
describes the apparatus and software tools used in our experiments.
In Section 5, we explain our methodology which consists of various
phases such as scenario creation, data acquisition, data analysis,
inference engine construction, report generation. Then, we describe
our FEAAS automation tool. In Section 6, we discuss our findings
and results, and we list details of Nest related artifacts. Finally in
1The code can be downloaded from https://github.com/gdorai/FEAAS-Tool.git
2The dataset can be downloaded from https://agp.newhaven.edu/
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Figure 1: A paradigm for smart-home IoT forensic ecosystem.
(Source of device images: nest.com, store.google.com)
Section 7 we discuss our work’s limitations, followed by conclusion
in Section 8.
2 RELATEDWORK AND BACKGROUND
In this section we discuss related work in IoT forensic frameworks
and digital forensics of IoT devices as well as background informa-
tion related to iOS forensics.
2.1 IoT Forensics Frameworks
Researchers have designed various frameworks for conducting IoT
forensics. One such model is the Forensics-aware IoT (FAIoT) model,
which is a high-level model that aims to support forensic investiga-
tions by systematically analyzing the challenges and opportunities
in IoT forensics [35]. The forensics process including authorization,
planning, analysis and storage, has been addressed by another IoT
top-down digital forensic investigation methodology [25]. Addi-
tionally, a general Digital Forensic Investigation Framework for IoT
(DFIF-IoT) was also proposed describing a proactive process which
occurs before IoT incident identification, and a reactive process
that happens after an IoT incident is identified [18]. Our work is
synonymous to the reactive process strategy described by DFIF-IoT
[18].
In another effort, Meffert et al. [23] conceived the Forensic State
Acquisition from Internet of Things (FSAIoT), a general framework
and practical approach for IoT forensics through IoT device state
acquisition. In their work they explicated that IoT state data (such as
device on, or off), can be gathered and logged in real time through
the use of a Forensic State Acquisition Controller (FSAC), where
data can be acquired from an IoT device, the cloud, or from another
controller. They did indeed leverage the Nest open APIs to pull the
state of the Nest thermostat whenever data is exchanged to the
cloud. However, accessing historical data and deleted data from the
IoT devices was not possible. In their work, they did not focus on
companion devices, such as mobile phones used to control the IoT
smart home systems. Our proposed research instead focused on
the extraction of evidentiary data from the companion device, the
iPhone, which was used to control the IoT devices under scrutiny.
2.2 IoT and Digital Forensics
There have been previous efforts aimed at recovering forensic arti-
facts from IoT devices used by consumers - either from the device
or from the cloud. Client-centric and cloud-native artifacts stored
within companion clients of the Amazon Echo was studied and
analyzed by Chung et.al [6]. Additionally, Rajewski [27] recov-
ered artifacts from Android mobile applications used to control IoT
consumer products including the WinkHub, Samsung SmartCam,
Amazon Echo and Nest devices. With respect to Nest devices, user
account information was recovered from the Android cache files
and a cross-platform tool known as “ffmpeg” 3 was used to convert
the media files stored in the image manager disk cache to obtain
the video files. However, they did not focus on recovering artifacts
from iOS devices. While recovering media files may be helpful for
an investigation, our work adds to the body of knowledge, and
provides a combined report of all the activities recorded through
several IoT devices stored by the Nest mobile application.
Other work focused on the network flow of data, especially the
work by Copos et al. [7], where they analyzed network traffic gen-
erated by the Nest thermostat and smoke detector and showed that
traffic analysis enabled them to determine the thermostat transi-
tion between Home and Auto Away mode with 88% accuracy. This
approach, however, requires setting up the network traffic monitor
in advance and may not be helpful to investigators in a postmortem
situation.
Central to our work is also the original work on the logical
backup acquisition and analysis of iOS devices by Bader and Baggili
[4]. In their work they examined the logical backup acquisition
3https://www.ffmpeg.org
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of the iOS mobile device using the Apple iTunes backup utility.
The authors found significant data of forensic value in the logical
backup, which we have adopted in our work. Similarly, Husain et al.
[14] presented a simple and inexpensive framework for forensic ac-
quisition of iPhone devices. This work also provided useful insights
related to the production of a forensically sound report for use in
the court. Using their framework iFF, they were able to extract plain
text passwords, conversation, user accounts, etc., using the iTunes
backup utility from non-jailbroken devices.
At the time of writing, there was no published account that
examined digital evidence acquired from iOS companion devices
used to control Nest IoT platforms, whilst also constructing a tool
to automate the forensic analysis process - a gap that this work
fills.
3 IOT FORENSIC CHALLENGES
Recent advancements in systems and the emergence of IoT has led
to a scientifically unexplored area in digital forensics. In this section,
we discuss the prominent challenges involved in IoT forensics which
includes the diversity of protocols, volatile nature of IoT data as
well as various considerations in smart-home IoT ecosystems.
3.1 Diversity of Protocols
The operating system loaded on Nest devices remains proprietary
to Nest Labs, although it is based on Linux. These devices intercon-
nect with each other using a protocol called Weave [20]. Weave is
a compact message format and communicates only when it needs
to. Home devices like Honeywell products use the Z-Wave [34]
protocol, and other smart-home devices use the Zigbee [36] com-
munication protocol. The non-standardization of communication
protocols and closed system architectures create unprecedented
forensic challenges.
3.2 Data Volatility
In a typical digital forensic investigation, Chain of Custody (CoC)
of the digital evidence is followed by preservation, collection, exam-
ination, analysis and presentation of evidence. Whereas, in an IoT
environment, maintaining CoC of the evidence and preserving it
may prove cumbersome. Many IoT devices use Real Time Operating
Systems (RTOSs) which do not persist data. Evidence acquisition
can be unreliable due to the transient nature of IoT ad-hoc net-
work connectivity. Above all, researchers and forensic experts have
recently examined and defined digital forensic investigation frame-
works specific to IoT [18, 23, 35] to deal with the volatile nature of
the evidence. Until a widely acceptable framework is adopted, IoT
investigations will remain time consuming and complex.
3.3 Smart Home IoT Ecosystems
Generally speaking, to recover evidence from a smart home IoT
platform, four items should be considered: (1) Companion-Client
Analysis: This is used to identify client-centric artifacts from mo-
bile devices or Web browsers. Significant data associated with Nest
device activities may be available, but consolidating the evidence is
challenging. (2) Cloud Analysis: This will be helpful in order to ana-
lyze artifacts stored in the Cloud by providing valid user credentials
for authentication. We observed that it was not possible to alter
historical data on home.nest.com for thermostat. Whereas, deleting
historical video-data is possible.(3) Network Analysis: Network mon-
itoring and analysis of network traffic is helpful in reconnaissance,
collection of usage statistics, software and system logs which are
uploaded to the cloud through the network. (4) IoT Device Analysis:
Analyzing the memory of IoT devices may help reveal data stored
in the device’s memory. Since many devices do not have persistent
storage, and in specific, Nest devices do not have a memory card,
we focused our attention to data that may be acquired from mobile
companion devices.
4 TEST ENVIRONMENT
In this section we list the details of the test environment used in our
experiments. The apparatus is listed in Table 1. In our work we used
the Nest 3rd generation learning thermostat, a Nest indoor camera,
a Nest outdoor camera and a Google Home Mini speaker. We note
that, we tried to integrate Apple’s HomePod [16] in our experiments,
but Nest devices were not compatible with HomeKit [15]. Hence,
we opted to use the Google HomeMini since it was compatible with
Nest devices. The list of tools used in our experiments is shown in
Table 2.
Table 1: Test Environment
Item Description
IoT Devices (1) Nest Learning Thermostat, 3rd Generation
(Model Number: T3007ES), (Quantity: 1)
(2) Google Home Mini (Model Number:
GA00216-US), (Quantity: 1)
(3) Nest Cam Indoor Security Camera (Model
Number: NC21102ES), (Quantity: 1)
(4) Nest Outdoor Security Camera (Model
Number: NC2100ES), (Quantity: 1)
Other Devices/Apps (1) iPhone 8 (iOS 11.2.6)
(2) iPhone 6s (iOS 11.2.5)
(3) iPhone 6 (iOS 10.3.3)
(4) Mac OS X (v10.12.6)
(5) Lenovo Y510P - Ubuntu (v16.04)
(6) Nest iOS app (v5.19.1)
(7) Google Home iOS app (v1.28.508)
Testing period 2018-03-15 to 2018-04-05
5 METHODOLOGY
We built an open-source forensic tool called Forensic Evidence
Acquisition and Analysis System (FEAAS), that consolidates evi-
dentiary data into a readable report that can infer user events. In this
section we discuss the methodology used for building this tool in
five major phases: scenario creation, data acquisition, data analysis,
inference engine construction and report engine construction.
5.1 Scenario Creation
During this study, the Nest IoT devices were controlled using sev-
eral methods such as through the Nest iOS application and Web
application, by voice commands using Google Home Mini, and
lastly by manually adjusting the device. Note that in our experi-
ments, we did not have any other human subjects involved other
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Table 2: Software Tools Used
Software Tool Description Version
DB Browser for SQLite An open source, freeware vi-
sual tool used to design and edit
SQLite database files [28]
3.10.0
PLIST Editor Downloaded from Mac App
store. Used to visualize and edit
property list (.plist) data
1.6 (8)
iTunes Utility to create backup of
iPhones [2]
12.7.2.58
SQLite3 View SQLite databases [29] 3.20.1
Google Chrome Used as web browser and ana-
lyzing cache files
63.0.3239.84
Epoch Converter Used to convert Unix Epoch
time format into local time [8]
-
ChromagnonCache Set of tools used for Chrome
forensics [5]
-
than the authors. We have created scenarios in order to validate ini-
tial findings in SQLite files. The following scenarios were executed
to control the thermostat and the camera:
• Manual calibration by dialing the thermostat ring on the
Nest thermostat for adjusting the temperature.
• Adjusting the temperature by talking to Google Home Mini.
• Adjusting the temperature by logging into Nest website.
• Adjusting the temperature by using the Nest iOS application.
• Changing the camera’s settings by logging into Nest website.
• Changing the camera’s settings by using the Nest iOS appli-
cation.
Note that the Nest camera does not have a physical button to turn it
on/off or make any other changes. It is also important to note that
even though a Google Home Mini was added to the environment
and the Nest application was configured through it, there was
no voice command allowed to turn the camera on/off. However,
the camera’s live video can be streamed on a display using voice
commands.
We also list a specific set of experiments conducted on the ther-
mostat and camera for a period of about 20 days. In the items listed
below, items 1 through 7 were performed on the thermostat device.
Items 8 and 9 are the set of experiments performed on the camera
device. These experiments were coined with the central idea of
figuring out where the state changes were recorded in the mobile
backup based on user’s actions and location.
(1) Raise/lower the current temperature to a certain degree.
(2) Change the settings from heat to cool.
(3) Turn Away(Eco) mode ON manually.
(4) User was connected to a Wi-Fi network.
(5) User left the home and returned at a certain time of the day.
This was conducted on 03/31/18.
(6) User was driving when the phone is connected to a cellular
network.
(7) User was at a location where there was no Internet connec-
tion. The cellular data was also not used in this scenario.
This was conducted on 03/30/18.
(8) Turning the camera on/off at some point in the day using
web application, and the mobile app.
(9) Defining two activity zones for camera to get notification
about motions in the zone.
Since the Nest mobile application has the option to track a user’s
phone location using Geo-fencing [3], we can observe the entry
and exit of a user from the fence (200m around the location where
the device is pinned). If the user has opted out of this option in the
mobile application, then the motion sensor embedded within the
IoT device is used to sense the presence of the user. In our work
we opted to use the Geo-fence instead of the motion sensor. The
Nest application was given permission to use the mobile phone’s
location services.
5.2 Data Acquisition
In this phase, the user’s iPhone device was connected to a foren-
sic workstation using a Universal Serial Bus (USB) cable and a
script was run in order to obtain a complete unencrypted backup
of the device. The artifacts were extracted using an open source
cross-platform software protocol library libimobiledevice which can
communicate with iOS devices [32]. We then employed a utility
called idevicebackup2 in order to create a backup of the iOS device
[31]. The backed up file names are SHA-1 hash values (hexadecimals
with 40 characters each). Upon further examination, we note that
each file was named as the result of a SHA-1 hash computed on the
file name in the format domain-[subdomain-]fullpath/filename.ext.
We used a script to automate the process of locating the Nest
artifacts (nest.sqlite database file, plist file, GooseEventLogging
file) and Google Home Mini artifacts (HomeGraphModel database
file) in the iOS backup. Data obtained using the iOS backup utility
contained multiple files with information about the thermostat and
camera data, Google analytics configuration data, list of connected
devices and user preference information, etc.
We located theNest app user data in theAppGroup com.nestlabs.j-
asper.release and Google Home app user data in the App Group
com.google.Chromecast in the backup folder by mapping the equiva-
lent SHA-1 of the file path. Each new version of the Nest or Google
Home Mini application may result in database structure variations.
For example, new tables may be added to the database. The table
names may also vary. Hence, each time these applications are up-
dated by the iTunes utility, we ensure that our FEAAS tool has been
updated to produce expected results.
Table 3 lists various files used in our study to recover useful
information. UDID represents the Unique Device Identifier of the
iPhone. We also share the respective SHA-1 values of the files in
the backup. As a useful insight to investigators, we note that the
path names (except UDID) remain the same when locating artifacts.
In our experiments with multiple iOS devices, the backup folder
paths remained the same, with the exception of the UDID since it
is unique to every iPhone and can be found easily when an iPhone
is connected to the iTunes utility [24].
5.3 Data Analysis
The iOS applications used for controlling IoT devices were found
to use SQLite databases. Most of the evidence data was found in
these database files. Property List (Plist) files were analyzed using a
Plist Editor. The Info.plist file contained the iPhone’s build version,
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), phone number,
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Table 3: Location of Client-centric Artifacts
Full File Path in Mac-OSX Filename Used to obtain
[BaseFolder]/ Info.plist, Status.plist, Manifest.db iOS Device info and backup status
[BaseFolder]/c5/c5ad63c1c7304bbc53dcd4ac9b7a35060450f8e7 Nest.sqlite (Nest) Thermostat and camera activities
[BaseFolder]/e1/e1da0e82d74bf22b60dc11a27bedda82f6525590 com.nestlabs.jasper.release.plist (Nest) Device setup information
[BaseFolder]/47/47df8f986e7ae5ca105bc12f3deb7f2499464f76 GooseEventLogging (Nest) Network type, geo-fence log
[BaseFolder]/9f/9fce4727c3b25498e410a27309e0de3f7c6affad HomeGraphModel (Google Home) Lists connected devices
[BaseFolder]/1d/1d75375510a87429993ca573ad7c883f8195ce72 com.google.Chromecast.plist (Google Home) Device setup information
/Users/[Username]/Library/Caches/Google/Chrome/Default/Cache/ Chrome cache Native artifacts in cache data frames
*Note: iOS backup files were located in Mac OSX file path /Users/[Name]/ Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup/ followed by the UDID. For
presentation in the table, we list this path as the [BaseFolder].
last backup date, product version, product type, UDID, sync set-
tings and a list of applications installed on the device. Status.plist
contained vital information about the backup date and status of
the backup such as whether or not a full backup was performed.
This information is required to ensure we have the complete set of
data needed from the phone. The plist files within the IoT mobile
application (see Table 3) were parsed to obtain the version of the
mobile application, the date of the device activation, the date of
application installation, user account and the device pairing token.
In the next section, we list the inference rules constructed into the
automation script. In Section 6, we discuss our findings and results
of data analysis in detail.
5.4 Inference Engine Construction
In order to produce a report of user’s location and a time-line of
series of events, we created a set of inference rules. The inference
engine is an intermediate step between analyzing the data and
creating the report, and can also be viewed as part of the report
generation. The rules allow us to create a human-readable report
from the raw data. We process the data present in the GooseEvent-
Logging file which contains information about the network type
of user’s iPhone for a certain time-stamp. We specifically parse
the file to obtain data about FenceEvent and FenceReport. We then
apply our inference rules on this information to produce the re-
port. Various network types which we identified by parsing the
GooseEventLogging file are Cellular, Wi-Fi or No Connection.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the rules as conditional statements. In this
pseudocode, we obtain information about the type of network to
which the user’s iPhone is connected (lines 11-15), and print user’s
location with respect to where the Nest device is installed and based
on the fence events (lines 21-37). We parse the GooseEventLogging
file to construct a list of relevant events about network type from
the overall FenceReport. Then, we identify whether the FenceEvent
type is Enter or Exit. Once the fence event type is identified, we
infer whether the user has left home, or has just arrived based on
the previous status of a user’s location.
5.5 Report Engine Construction
After parsing the data and applying the inference rules, the report
engine produces a PDF report. Figure 2 shows an example of a
portion of the report generated using this engine. The following
are a few examples of information that can be observed from the
report:
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for Inference Engine
1: eventid ← 0
2: eventIndexList ← []
3: relevantEvents ← []
4: for all item in allEvents do
5: if item.event is FenceEvent then
6: relevantEvents .append(item)
7: eventIndexList .append(eventid)
8: eventid++
9: else if item.event is FenceReport then
10: for all i in eventIndexList do
11: if item.NetworkType is No Connection then
12: relevantEvents[i].InternetStatus ← O f f line
13: else
14: relevantEvents[i].InternetStatus ← Online
15: end if
16: end for
17: eventIndexList ← []
18: end if
19: end for
20: atHome ← False
21: for all item in relevantEvents do
22: if item.type is ENTER then
23: if atHome is True then
24: print “User is at home .”
25: else
26: print “User arrived home .”
27: atHome ← True
28: end if
29: else if item.type is EXIT then
30: if atHome is True then
31: print “User le f t home .”
32: atHome ← False
33: else
34: print “User is outside .”
35: end if
36: end if
37: end for
• Knowing the fact that Google Home Mini has been config-
ured to control the Nest thermostat and the mobile backup
data shows evidence of the thermostat being adjusted using
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Figure 2: A sample FEAAS report
voice commands, implies that someone has been present at
home at that specific time (and has adjusted the thermostat).
• The evidence shown in the backup files about HOME/AWAY
information recorded by the Nest app, implies whether the
user has been in close proximity of the house or not at a
specific time.
• The fact that the mobile phone was connected to a Wi-Fi,
and the Internet status was Online along with fence-event
as Enter at a specific time implies that the user was at home.
This report contains critical information to aid an investigation
along with the timestamps, events, inferences, user information
and device information. This report can be used by investigators
for reporting CoC and analyzing events. Inference column in the
report can provide useful clues to the investigator.
5.6 FEAAS Tool
The FEASS tool we built is a command-line program written us-
ing Shell script (version 3.2.57) and Python (version 3.6.2). The
automation script is named AutomationScript.sh which installs es-
sential utilities and python packages such as libimobiledevice [32],
carthage [9], biplist [11] and reportlab [12]. The package Carthage
is a dependency manager; Biplist is a Python package which is used
to parse binary plist and Reportlab is a Python tookit which is an
open-source library for generating PDFs. The AutomationScript.sh
then runs another shell script called DevicePairing.sh in order to
pair the iPhone device with the computer. Once the user establishes
trust between the computer and iPhone device by clicking “Trust”
button on the iPhone, the device will be paired with the computer.
Then, the script will start acquiring an unencrypted backup of the
iPhone device.
On successful completion of backup acquisition, a python script
will parse the backup files in order to locate and analyze artifacts
related to the IoT applications (Nest app and Google Home Mini).
ParserThermostat.py is a Python script which is used to parse the
thermostat-related data whereas ParserCamera.py is used parse
the camera-related data. The AutomationScript requires one input
parameter; a path to the iOS backup files. The output of the tool is a
report file containing all the fence events and device events in PDF
format (See Figure 2.) The tool also has the feature of producing
a “.csv” report file. Fence events and device events are ordered
chronologically in the report along with inferences.
6 DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS
As mentioned before, the Nest iOS application manages most of the
information in a database file called Nest.sqlite. We found that this
database contain hundreds of tables. The event-related tables mostly
have start date/time and end date/time in Unix epoch format [8].
Significant tables and their relevant fields are listed in Table 4.
There are three preliminary tables such as Z_PRIMARYKEY,
Z_METADATA and Z_MODELCACHE. Z_PRIMARYKEY contains
the index of database tables. The table Z_METADATA contains
hashes of table model version identifiers (NSStoreModelVersion-
Hashes, that is, if the backing data store has support for schema
migration, the automatically generated model version hashes are
stored in the backing store) [17].
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Table 4: Overview of Relevant Tables in Nest Database
Table Relevant Fields
ZCDSTRUCTURE ZCREATION_TIME - Installation time of the app.
ZCDSTRUCTURE ZPOSTAL_CODE - Postal code entered during device activation.
ZCDSTRUCTURE ZCOUNTRY_CODE - Country code.
ZCDSTRUCTURE ZSTRUCTUREID - Unique identifier of the user account associated with the device.
ZCDGEOFENCE ZLATITUDE, ZLONGITUDE - Location to which the device was pinned.
ZCDUSERSESSION ZNAME - Name associated with the user.
ZCDUSERSESSION ZUSER, ZUSERID - Identifier used for updating user actions on the device.
ZCDUSERSESSION ZEMAIL - Email id of the user.
ZCDUSERSESSION ZPRIMARY_PHONE - Primary phone number of the user.
ZCDUSERSESSION ZPROFILE_IMAGE_URL - Profile picture of the user.
ZCDBASEDEVICE ZCREATIONTIME - Installation time of the device.
ZCDBASEDEVICE ZLASTCONNECTIONTIME - Last time when the device communicated with the cloud.
ZCDBASEDEVICE ZLOCALIPADDRESS - Local IP Address used.
ZCDBASEDEVICE ZMAC_ADDRESS - MAC address.
ZCDENERGYEVENT ZTOUCHEDWHEN - Various event time-stamp
ZCDENERGYEVENT ZCOOLTEMP, ZHEATTEMP - Temperature changes
ZCDENERGYEVENT ZTOUCHEDID - What caused the adjustment to the device? (User/Google Assistant/Other)
ZCDSCRUBBYCHUNKINFO ZSTARTDATE, ZENDDATE - Start/End time of the chunk of camera video data.
ZCDSCHEDULESETPOINT ZTOUCHEDAT, ZTEMPERATURE - An overview of temperature schedule by (epoch) date.
Figure 3: Nest website snapshot for experiment #5
The ZCDSTRUCTURE table reveals the postal code, time zone,
city and the date of device activation. In order to reveal the details
of a user, it is sufficient to examine ZCDUSERSESSION where the
e-mail of the user and the profile images are saved in columns
ZEMAIL and ZPROFILE_IMAGE_URL respectively. The URLs used
for uploading logs and transporting objects are found in table ZC-
DUSERSESSIONURLS. The table ZCDWHERE has entries to map
location names such as Bedroom, Entryway, Family Room, Front
Yard, etc. to a WHERE_ID, which is used in the ZCDBASEDEVICE
table to indicate where the device is installed. This helps us identify
the specific location of an activity.
The table ZCDGEOFENCE stores the physical location in terms
of latitude/longitude where a device is pinned. The temperature ad-
justments to the thermostat are recorded in the ZCDENERGYEVENT
table along with timestamps. Suppose, if multiple thermostats are
used in a smart home, then, ZCDENERGYEVENT also relates tem-
perature adjustment to thermostats based on locations defined by
the user (for example, upstairs/downstairs). ZCDSCHEDULE con-
tains information about the current schedule mode set in the respec-
tive thermostats (For example: Schedule mode can be Cool/Heat).
The table ZCDSCHEDULESETPOINT lists the temperature adjust-
ments by userID. For example, user identified by user-id (such as
“user.9****55”) performed a temperature adjustment and a history
of maximum/minimum temperatures.
The table ZCDSCRUBBYCHUNKINFO contains information about
video frames transferred to the cloud at certain time intervals
and can especially be useful for investigations. The table contains
ZCHUNKIDENTIFIER which is an epoch time indicating the start
date of the chunk, ZSTARTDATE, and ZENDDATE. Each row in-
dicates a chunk of 20 frames. Analyzing the difference between
the end date and the start date shows that if the camera is ON, the
difference for each row is about 19-21 minutes. In case the cam-
era is OFF at some intervals, this difference is much larger than
21 minutes, since during that period the data is not transferred to
the cloud. The large time difference can be an indication to the
investigator that the camera has been turned off during that period.
In order to validate the results obtained from our Report Engine,
we kept detailed journal notes in which we had recorded all user
actions as part of the experiments. We can view the device events
by accessing the historical time-line information from the cloud
using the Nest Home website. The history (available for the last 10
days) clearly shows whether the thermostat temperature schedule
was set by Auto-schedule, manual calibration, Nest companion
applications or Eco temperature was set because no one was home.
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Here we discuss a few examples of the experiments we did to
verify the report that was generated by our tool with information
available on the mobile app, the cloud and our detailed journal notes
which contains the ground truth. In experiment #5 (as described in
Section 5.1), where the user left the home at a certain time in a day
and arrived later at a certain time was correctly acquired from the
cloud since the user’s phone location was ON and the phone was
using cellular data. This is recorded by the mobile application as
well as the cloud. Our parsing tool was also able to obtain this data.
Figure 3 shows a snapshot of the Nest thermostat website where we
can observe that no one was home where a gray home symbol inside
a circle is found between the time 1PM and 9PM. The same can be
observed in the report (Figure 2 Part-II) where a fence event “Exit”
happened on 03-31-18 14:49:10, and a fence event “Enter” happened
at 21:12:43.
The GooseEventLogging file has record of up to 10-days of data
and the nest.sqlite database has all the data starting from the instal-
lation date of the app. In experiment #7 (described in Section 5.1),
where the user was in a location away from home with iPhone
not connected to either Wi-Fi or Cellular network, the phone’s
location could not be uploaded to the cloud and hence, AWAY mode
was not triggered automatically. We can observe this in the re-
port where the entry “No Connection” can be found on 03-30-18
09:09:40. Also, whenever the user’s iPhone could not upload data
to the cloud right-away, a log was found in GooseEventLogging file.
This data appears to be a queued-up data for the key: FenceReport
in GooseEventLogging file.
When the iPhone is connected to the internet, this data queue
gets uploaded to the cloud and leaves a trace in the FenceReport.
Experiment #7 is an interesting example where we can infer that
the user was not home (by looking into the mobile backup data)
but this could not be observed in the cloud right away. Therefore,
in a way, the mobile data can provide more insight in an abnormal
scenario where the user’s mobile application was running in the
background in order to log the phone’s location but could not
upload it to the cloud immediately. Figure 4 shows a snapshot of
this scenario where the thermostat had been running throughout
the day without automatically setting “Eco” temperature in AWAY
mode. The results in the report (see Figure 2 Part-II,-III,-IV) matched
the data stored in the cloud. This shows that we were able to recover
most of the artifacts from the mobile backup in normal operation
mode.
The list of devices that are configured to be controlled by Google
Home Mini (voice commands) can be identified by parsing the
HomeGraphModel database. The table ZDEVICE has information
about the connected IoT devices (nest-home-assistant-prod) in ZA-
GENTID field. In the same table, the field ZDEVICETYPE lists the
role of connected devices such as action.devices.types.THERMOSTAT
and SPEAKER. The table ZTRAIT helps identify the role of these
connected devices in the field ZIDENTIFICATION such as Assistant
and TemperatureSetting. The user and device profile information
was recovered using the com.google.Chromecast.plist file.
It is essential to show that the data collected from the mobile
backup is associated with the evidential IoT device. Hence, we
mounted the thermostat and the camera on a Linux file system
(Ubuntu 16.04) by connecting the device to the computer using
a USB cable. We recovered a file called Technical Info.plist and
Info.plist from the thermostat and the camera accordingly. The table
ZCDBASEDEVICE has data in the columns such as ZIDENTIFIER,
ZDIAMONDBACKPLATE matched the data we recovered from
the Techinal Info.plist file. ZIDENTIFIER is the serial number of
the display and ZDIAMONDBACKPLATE is the serial number of
the base of the thermostat. The MAC address retrieved from the
Technical Info.plist file and the table ZCDBASEDEVICE was found
to be the same. This is helpful in tying an evidential device to a
phone.
6.1 Camera Artifacts Recovered from Chrome
Cache
Since our approach focused on the logical acquisition of data which
does not include deleted data, we turned our focus to the potential
of reconstructing deleted artifacts from Chrome cache. As men-
tioned earlier, Nest users can access their devices through the
home.nest.com website to view videos recorded by Nest camera.
When a user uses a browser like Google Chrome for this purpose,
website and cookie data (such as JavaScript scripts, graphic images,
html files, multimedia contents), will be available in cache. The
results described in this section are not a part of our FEAAS tool
nor the inference engine, since the tool mainly focuses on analyz-
ing the artifacts from iOS devices. To be able to analyze artifacts
from Chrome Cache, the investigator needs to have access to the
computer (in this case, a MacBook) used by the Nest user. However,
the results in this section could be of importance, especially in cases
when some video clips have been deleted from the account, but
when Chrome cache preserved the data. This technique can then
be used to recover these deleted artifacts.
We examined Google Chrome cache to obtain such artifacts. As
per the description of Chrome Disk Cache Format [10], cache files
include the index file (which is a hash table of Uniform Resource
Locater (URL) of objects stored in it), data block files, and separate
data stream files. Data block files with file names data_# store
small objects. Separate data streams are contained inside the files
named f_######. We were also able to find compressed JSON strings
(content-encoding was in gzip format and content-type was JSON
format).
We employed an open source tool called Chromagnon4 in order
to parse Chrome cache files stored on Mac OSX. The following
command $ python2 chromagnonCache.py /User/[Username]/Library
/Caches/Google/Chrome/Default/Cache -o ParsedCache/ was used in
the terminal for parsing cache files from the default location. The
expected lifetime of these artifacts in normal operational mode is
until the user clears the browsing history and cache files.
Using the aforementioned command, the Chromagnon parser [5]
creates a directory called ParsedCache where we can find cache
artifacts. This directory contains an index.html file and several
other files. The index.html file contain links to all cached data
(such as text files, image files, event clips, profile picture of the
user, etc). To specifically locate artifacts related to event clips and
images, we filtered the html links to find the term “get_event_clip”
and “get_image” respectively. By clicking on the filtered link, we
were able to locate the file containing the link to the preview of
the video clip (with 9 frames in each). Figure 5 is a snapshot of
4https://github.com/JRBANCEL/Chromagnon
I Know What You Did Last Summer: Your Smart Home Internet
of Things and Your iPhone Forensically Ratting You Out ARES 2018, August 27–30, 2018, Hamburg, Germany
Figure 4: Nest website snapshot for experiment #7
Figure 5: Snapshot of a Cache-file
a file present in ParsedCache (note that we masked some of the
characters in the snapshot). We can observe that this file contains
some critical details like when the video was captured in epoch
time(cuepoint_id in “Key”) and also when the video data was last
accessed (“Creation Time”) in GMT. By looking into these files we
were able to recover images and event clips stored in the cache.
Figure 6 shows an example of an image of the lab recorded through
the Nest Indoor Camera which we were able to obtain from the
cache.
This technique would be very useful to investigators for recov-
ering artifacts post-deletion since the camera’s video history and
snapshots are unrecoverable (even from the cloud) once they are
deleted [19].
7 LIMITATIONS
This work has several limitations. The first is that if different ver-
sions of the iPhone operating system and future versions of the
Nest applications are used, our results may vary. The second being
that our study was limited to iPhones. Lastly, our work is focused
on data that is logically acquired from the mobile device, which
means that it will only work if data has not been deleted from the
phone under examination.
Figure 6: Recovered Chrome Cache Artifact
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
People are starting to adopt smart home technologies. Almost all
smart home devices are connected to an application on the mobile
device for ease of use and control, therefore, automating the forensic
analysis of the mobile devices in the IoT ecosystem becomes crucial.
We documented our approach for recovering artifacts from the
mobile device. We were able to find relevant data from databases
recovered from the mobile device’s backup that show information
such as the date and time at which certain changes were made to
the Nest devices. This includes whether anyone manually calibrated
the thermostat, whether the user was present at home during a
certain time, whether the user spoke to the Google Home Mini
device to make any adjustments to the thermostat, and whether
the camera was intentionally turned off at a certain time.
In the future, we would like to focus more on the cloud side of
the analysis, especially for the Google Home Mini product. Most of
the data is more easily available on the cloud, but accessing cloud
requires a Subpoena. We also would like to analyze IoT mobile
applications in order to obtain the alert notifications received by
a user (such as, a sound heard, or a movement on a specific zone
detected, or someone at the door, etc). We aim to conduct this study
on a jail-broken device. We also plan to study other Nest devices
such as the Nest Doorbell and Alarm System in order to acquire
more data that can be inferred as a result of the interaction of all
the IoT devices in a smart home. Also, in our future work we will
conduct experiments using the HomeBridge Nest plugin [21] in
order to study the exchange of information between HomePod and
connected devices.
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